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Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Discipline of:
Richard M. La Jeunesse, Utah State
Bar Number 7408
            Respondent
RESPONDENT’S TRIAL BRIEF   
Case No. 130905706
Judge Andrew H. Stone
Respondent Richard M. La Jeunesse, by and through counsel hereby
submits his trial brief.
The administrative law judges of the Utah Labor Commission adjudicate
inter alia disputes between occupationally injured employees and their employers
and their insurance carriers.  Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801 (2012).   Judge La1
Jeunesse and Judge Hann were, at all times relevant, an administrative law judge
at the Utah Labor Commission. 
In certain cases involving conflicting medical opinions generally between
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2the treating physician and an Independent Medical Examiner (IME) retained by
the insurance carrier, the Adjudicative Division of the Utah Labor Commission,
responsible to conduct formal hearings for the Commission, is required to utilize a
Medical Panel to advise and assist the administrative law judge in the medical
aspects of the case.  Utah Administrative Code R. 602-2-2. 
Between January of 2012 and June of 2012 Judge Hann in five separate
workers’ compensation cases received Medical Panel Reports in workers’
compensation cases assigned to her where she requested a written clarification to
the Medical Panel Report under Utah Code Section 34A-2-601(2)(b)(ii).  This
clarification is allowed prior to sending the Report to the parties as required later
in the statute pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(2)(d)(i). 
On July 9, 2012, the Labor Commissioner notified Judge Hann that she
intended to impose a written reprimand for violating the Labor Commission’s
Code of Conduct and Employee Ethics and Conflict of Interest Policy, both
promulgated, in part, pursuant to Utah Code Title 67, Chapter 16, Utah Public
Officers and Employees Ethics Act.  As Judge Hann’s direct supervisor the Labor
Commission took action against Judge LaJeunesse pursuant to the same set of
facts and considerations and terminated his employment as the Director of
Adjudication although subsequently reemploying him as an administrative law
00958
3judge in another division. 
OPC’s Complaint alleges violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d),
Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.  Rule 8.4(d) states: “[i]t is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (d) engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice; . . .”  The Rules of Professional
Conduct means “the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct (including the
accompanying comments) initially adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in 1988, as
amended from time to time; . . .” Rules Governing the Utah State Bar, Rule 14-
502(k).  
The only Comment to Rule 8.4 mentioning subsection (d) states:  
[3] A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly
manifests by words or conduct bias or prejudice based upon race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are
prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy
respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial
judge’s finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a
discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this rule. 
(emphasis added).
The alleged violation does not fall into the category of a “lawyer representing a
client” in any respect.  This court found in denying Judge La Jeunesse’s 12(b)(6)
motions he read the comment too broadly, the rule must mean something more
than mistaken interpretation of the law by one charged with interpreting the law.  
00959
4In the case of Utah State Bar v. Jardine, 2012 UT 67, 289 P.3d 516, the
Utah Supreme Court examined OPC’s recommendation, and the district court’s
finding that Mr. Jardine had violated rule 8.4(d) (in addition to other violations not
discussed here).  Mr. Jardine had missed a court appearance.  The court indicated
that the rule exists to curb much greater evils (than missing a court date):
a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that
indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice.
Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust or serious
interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A
pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when
considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.  
Id. cmt. 2.    Jardine, ¶ 77,  289 P.3d at 533.  The court concluded the district court
erred in determining that Mr. Jardine violated rule 8.4(d) because the rule
contemplates much more severe conduct than missing a hearing.  Id. ¶ 75.  Judge
Hann and Judge La Jeunesse made their best effort to meet their legal obligations
as ALJs to interpret the law.  OPC asserts these acts were out of the ordinary, and
perhaps they were, but that does not make them “conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice.”  The acts were done in an effort to train the medical
panels.  When panels improperly answered questions, or pontificated about
medical concerns unrelated to the questions at hand, litigants were harmed by
needless appeals to clarify the question, which could be set straight from the outset
00960
5with a directive from the ALJ to do so.  Litigants had been complaining to the
Commission the panels needed additional training, the Adjudicative Division was
responsible to train the panels, and seeking clarification is a reasonable method to
train them.  Proposed trial Ex. R_23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33.
Both Judges Hann and La Jeunesse were motivated to try to improve the
system, and remained involved in medical panel training.  There is no evidence
other ALJs were so inclined, so it is not surprising other judges did not make these
efforts.  
I. The Complaint alleges statutory violation, but only under section 34A-
2-601(2)(d) without addressing 34A-2-601(2)(b).  
A. On July 10, 2012, the Utah labor Commission issued its report
finding that the conduct of Judge Hann and Judge La Jeunesse was
inappropriate and violated explicit and statutory requirements in the
Utah Worker’s (sic) Compensation Act and the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act.  
Complaint, ¶ 29.  The Complaint does not provide the specifics of the violation
alleged, and neither OPC nor the Labor Commission ever discuss the directives of
34A-2-601(2)(b).
B. Judge Hann’s failure to circulate the preliminary medical panel report
to all parties resulted in a probable deprivation of due process of the
litigants in the cases at issue.
Complaint, ¶ 33 (emphasis added).   By its own admission, the medical panel
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6report is preliminary, and it makes no sense to circulate draft reports to parties for
objections.  This would be inefficient, confusing, and terribly wasteful of
resources.  Litigants all had the opportunity to appeal, and none, as far as known
to Judge La Jeunesse and Judge Hann, ever did.  
II. There was no bright line policy prohibiting the acts.  
A. On July 18, 2012, Commissioner Hayashi issued a letter titled
imposition of Discipline Written Reprimand to Debbie Hann. 
Commissioner Hayashi stated that the requesting changes to medical
panel reports without notice to parties rejecting reports and
destroying reports when this has not been done in other cases was
inconsistent with well established practices.
Complaint, ¶ 30.  
B.  Commissioner Hayashi also stated that the improper destruction of
reports violated the Commission Code of Conduct’s prohibition
against wrongful destruction of records and that the conduct resulted
in substantial mistrust and doubt in the integrity of the ability of the
Commission to fulfill its mission and harmed the effectiveness of the
Commission. 
Complaint, ¶ 31.
Comm’r Hayashi informed Workers’ Compensation Stakeholders on June
14, 2012 that Judge Hann’s and Judge La Jeunesse’s actions with respect to the
cases at issue “are contrary to my expectations for transparency and openness in
the Commission’s adjudicative process.”  (Emphasis added), proposed Ex. R_
0049.  Hayashi’s termination letter to Judge La Jeunesse indicated his “failure to
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7insist on open and transparent process undermined the parties’ confidence that
their cases were being handled fairly and correctly and deprived them of their
ability to protect their rights.”  Hayashi did not cite any statute, policy or practice. 
OPC cites only to the provision WCF announced it thought was violated, 34A-2-
601(2)(d), paying no attention to 34A-2-601(2)(b).
There must be a mens rea to violate rule 8.4(d) – it cannot be just an
accident.  There never was a rule requiring preliminary reports be maintained, and
until the events in question, there had been open communication with the panels,
who are adjunct to the judges.  How can an entity be adjunct to the judges if they
cannot communicate?  Although Judge La Jeunesse can cite to no specific Utah
case on point, the case of Cooper v. Board of Professional Discipline of Idaho
State Board of Medicine, 134 Idaho 449, 4 P.3d 561 (Idaho, 2000) is instructive. 
The holder of a professional license has a valuable property right protected by the
safeguards of due process, and the professional is not required to defend against or
explain any matter not specified in the charges.   Cooper, 4 P.3d at 566.  There
never has been any willful violation of a rule, or willful violation of a law or
policy.  All efforts were made in earnest effort to improve services at the
Commission by asserting authority the judges believed they had. 
III. At all times relevant, Judge Hann and Judge La Jeunesse acted in their
00963
8roles as ALJs, the actions were governed by Section 34A-2-601, and all
decisions of the ALJs were appealable.
At all times relevant to this action, Ms. Hann and Mr. La Jeunesse acted in
their roles as ALJs in the Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. 
“This fact is undisputed.” OPC Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgement, ¶ 1.  Rules made under Title 34A section 1 include
procedures to dispose of cases informally,  expedite claims adjudication and to
dispose of cases by simplifying the methods of proof at a hearing. Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-1-304 (3).  The decisions of the administrative law judges of the Utah
Labor Commission are subject to appeal.  Utah Code Ann. Sections 34A-1-303,
34A-2-801.  Historically, since before 2000, communication between the
administrative law judges and the medical panel chairpersons was routine and not
reported to the parties.  (Affidavit of La Jeunesse in Support of Summary
Judgement, ¶ 12), (Affidavit of Hann in Support of Summary Judgement, ¶ 10).
Medical Panels function in an adjunct capacity as advisors and assistants to
the administrative law judge.  “The role of the Medical Panel is . . .‘advis[e] an
administrative law judge with respect to the administrative law judge’s fact-
finding responsibility.”  Blair v. Labor Commission, 2011 Utah App. 248, ¶ 18,
262 P. 3d 456, 461,  referencing Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(1)(d)(ii) (Supp.
00964
92010), Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Comm’n of Utah, 839 P. 2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1992) (role of panel is only to
assist the ALJ in deciding whether medical cause has been proven), Proposed Ex.
R_0018 (“service on medical panel was adjunct to the impartial fact-finding
responsibilities of Judge Luke and the Commission”).
At all times relevant to this action, the Adjudication Division of the Utah
was responsible for training the medical panels.  Administrative Law Judges sent a
Memorandum Letter to the Medical Panel as a Referral, which included the
language, “[t]hank you in advance for your assistance in resolving the medical
disputes in this matter.  If I can be of any assistance, please do not hesitate to
contact me at [phone number of judge].”  Proposed trial Ex. R_002 (emphasis
added).  This letter was always copied to the parties.  The ALJs proposed certain
questions to the medical panels which the medical panels were to answer.  Id. 
Proposed trial Ex. R_008 (Medical Panel Process Summary).   Communication
with the medical panel was assumed, and not objected to.
The reports are written to the judge.  Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(2)(b). 
The medical report written to the administrative law judge shall be in a “form
prescribed by the Division of Adjudication.”  Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(2)(b). 
The term “form prescribed by the Division of Adjudication” was not specifically
00965
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defined in the Utah Labor Code Workers’ Compensation Act or any administrative
rule or Commission policy.  Its interpretation was left to the sound discretion of
the administrative law judge presiding over the specific case.  Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-601(2)(b).  After the ALJ receives the report in proper form, the ALJ
distributes the report to the parties for their objections.  Only if the report is
properly supported by evidence, and after objections are ruled upon is it deemed
evidence and admitted as such.  Prior to its acceptance, the ALJ is allowed to
direct the panel to make additional findings as the ALJ may require.  Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-601(2)(b).  
At all times relevant to this action, reading the statute in the order it is
written allowed the administrative law judge not distribute copies of the medical
panel report until after seeking additional findings as necessary or unless it was “in
proper form.”  Section 34A-2-601(2)(d).   The administrative law judges of the
Labor Commission have a duty to interpret the law, even if the interpretation is in
error.  
Applying the statute in the order it is written is a legitimate, lawful, and
correct form of statutory interpretation.  Esquivel v. Labor Comm’n of Utah, 2000
UT 66,  ¶ 24, 7 P.3d 777, 782-83.  The plain meaning of the statute allows the ALJ
to ensure the report is in proper form before distributing it.  Florida Asset
00966
V-1 Oil asserted the attorney’s employment within a state agency created an unethical2
risk of bias in his role as an adjudicatory officer.  V-1 Oil, 939 P.2d 1192, 1194. 
11
Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 2006 UT 58, ¶ 9, 147 P.3d 1189.
OPC has denied it had any knowledge of policy at the Labor Commission
requiring distribution of the report, even if flawed.  OPC Response to La Jeunesse
Requests for Admissions Question No.7 “Objection, the OPC does not have any
direct knowledge of the policies of the Labor Commission and therefore cannot
admit or deny.”  Judge La Jeunesse wrote the first policy directing even flawed
reports to be distributed.  See proposed trial Ex. R_ 0036, R_0037, confirming the
new policy of June 6, 2012 is prospective only.  
IV. Ethical concerns are governed by the State Officers and Employees Act. 
 The Utah Supreme Court held  in V-1 Oil Co. v. Dept. of Environmental
Quality, 939 P.2d 1192, 1195 (Utah 1997)  that “the Utah Administrative Code2
and the State Officers and Employees Ethics Act provide rules that are directly
applicable to administrative adjudicative officers. . . .”  The court stated, “[t]he
proper starting point for any analysis of an asserted ethical conflict in an
adjudicatory proceeding is by reference to the ethical rules governing that
proceeding. . . . the Utah Administrative Code and the state Officers and
Employees Ethics Act provide rules that are directly applicable to administrative
00967
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adjudicative officers.”  Id.  The court relied on the function of the attorney as a
hearing officer, not his status as an attorney, finding he acted in a “adjudicative
role.”  Id. at 1196.  The court’s rationale parallels the function test and reasoning
of Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508, 511, 514, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911, 2913, 57
L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) even though Butz is not specifically mentioned (persons
performing adjudicative functions within federal agencies are entitled to absolute
immunity for their judicial acts because of the “special functions” involved).   
Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse has broad authority under § 34A-2-
802, and agency law demands efficiency.  Utah Code Title 34A, Chapters 1, 2. 
See § 34A-1-306 (2008) (orders are not to be “declared inoperative, illegal, or
void” for any omission of a technical nature).  The Labor Commission imposed its
own disciplinary action on both Judge La Jeunesse and Judge Hann.  Nowhere
does OPC address the need for efficiency in agency law.  Administrative actions
taken against the judges negate the need for any further action by OPC or this
court.  
V.  Mr. La Jeunesse is entitled to absolute immunity because he performed
the conduct alleged in his role as an adjudicator.  
In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508, 511, 514, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911,
2913, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) the Court found that persons performing
00968
Thus this court’s concern, in its ruling on Respondent’s 12(b)(6) motion, that there could3
be inferences in favor of OPC must be set aside under the immunity standards of Butz. 
13
adjudicatory functions within federal agencies are entitled to absolute immunity
for their judicial acts because of the “special functions” involved.  The Judicial
Officer and Chief Hearing Examiner “are . . . employees of the Executive Branch. 
Judges have absolute immunity not because of their particular location . . . but
because of the special nature of their responsibilities.”  Id. at 511.  “[T]he
correctability of error on appeal [is] just [one] of the many checks on [even]
malicious actions by judges.”  Id. at 512.   The Court reasoned, “[w]e think that3
adjudication [functions] share[] enough of the characteristics of the judicial
process that those who participate in such adjudication should also be immune
from suits for damages.”  Id. at 512-13.  The Court continued:
[T]he role of the . . . administrative law judge within this framework
is “functionally comparable” to that of a judge.  His powers are often .
. .comparable to those of a trial judge:  He may issue subpoenas, rule
on proffers of evidence, regulate the course of the hearing, and make
or recommend decisions.
Id. at 513.  See also Johnston v. Labor Commission, 2013 UT App 179, ¶ 12, 307
P.3d 615, 620 (administrative law judge has statutory discretion to decide whether
to hold objection hearing).  In Johnston, the court found the scenario where no
ruling was specifically made on the objection an acceptable process to admit the
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report into evidence under 34A-2-601 despite there being no such specific
language in the statute.  Id. at 624.  The court noted “[t]he scenario before us is
admittedly perplexing, and had the Legislature defined the scope and operation of
this third scenario, then the focus of this appeal would. . . not have turned solely
on our own interpretation of [34A-2-601].”  Id., ¶ 27.   If the law was
misinterpreted, or there was a defect in procedure, the court in In re Stoney, 2012
UT 64, ¶ 10, 289 P.3d 497, 501 holds the remedy for defects in following law or
procedure is appeal.  Administrative tribunals are not held to a more stringent
standard than trial courts.  Johnston v. Labor Comm’n, 2013 UT App 179, ¶ 16,
307 P.3d 615, 620. 
To allow a bar complaint to proceed against Judge La Jeunesse for his
adjudicative acts would produce the tangled mess of never-ending litigation and
“undue interference with [performance of his] duties and [the] potentially
disabling threats of liability” that Utah’s Supreme Court held Butz safeguards
against.  Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Utah 1993) (holding
quasi-judicial immunity extended to those engaged in the performance of duties
integral to the judicial process).
In Ambus v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 858 P.2d 1372, 1379 (Utah 1993), the
court relied on the Butz test ((1) adjudication, (2) adjudicatory acts likely to
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generate lawsuits from disappointed litigants, and (3) sufficient safeguards in
statutes and rules governing disciplinary to shield the Board from disgruntled
litigants.   
In Anderson v. Eyre, 2015 UT App 148, 353 P.3d 170, the court reiterated,
“‘judges are immune from suit for actions taken in their judicial capacities, except
when those actions have been taken in the absence of subject matter
jurisdiction[,]’ Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496, 498 (Utah 1998) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).”  Anderson v. Eyre, ¶ 3, 353 P.3d at 171.  The
Anderson Court went so far as to extend quasi-judicial immunity to court
personnel, stating, “[f]urthermore, quasi-judicial immunity is properly extended to
court personnel when, as here, the acts were committed as an integral part of the
judicial process within the cases.  Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 P.2d 1278, 1280
(Utah 1993).”  Anderson, ¶ 3, 353 P.3d at 171.  There was no policy prohibiting
the acts and all of the claims by OPC relate to decisions or actions taken by him in
his role as a Labor Commission adjudicator, and are as immune as the acts
considered by the court in Anderson v. Eyre.  OPC makes no credible argument the
acts were done in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction and has admitted the
ALJs were in an adjudicative role. 
VI. Public Policy dictates Judicial Codes Should Apply.
00971
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The Comment to Section I Applicability of Utah’s Judicial Code of Conduct
states that the rules in the code have been formulated to address the ethical
obligations of any person who serves a judicial function.  Utah law does not
contemplate OPC alleging conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice for
acts by administrative law judges interpreting the law.
The Alleged Violation is Unconstitutionally Void for Vagueness as Applied.
Rule 8.4 is a catch all provision lacking specificity.  The Utah Supreme
Court has ruled that rule 8.4(a) alone is no more than a “piling on” and repeated its
directive to decline to impose any sanction based on a violation of rule 8.4(a)  In
re Jardine, 2012 UT 67, ¶ 73, 289 P.3d 516, 532.  Under OPC’s application of rule
8.4(d), any appealable or questionable decision by any judge in the course of the
judge’s duties could be deemed by OPC to be “prejudicial to the administration of
justice.”  Constitutional validity is determined by examining whether the law fails
to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand
what conduct is prohibited or authorizes or encourages arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.  State v. Gallegos, 220 P.2d 136, 141 (Utah 2009).  
VII. Judge Hann’s Actions were consistent with her broad authority under
Utah Code Section 34A-2-802.
Labor Commission law allows ALJs to investigate.   Utah Code § 34A-2-
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601(2)(b)(ii) allows the judge to obtain additional findings from the medical panel. 
 The law states “The commission may make its investigation in such manner as in
its judgement is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and
to carry our justly the spirit of the chapter.”  Section 34A-2-802(1).  In seeking
clarifications from the medical panels and not retaining the preliminary reports,
Judge Hann took acts as in her best judgment were best calculated to ascertain the
substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the chapter.  As
such, she should not be prosecuted for conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice. 
VIII. OPC incorrectly argues the Medical Panel Reports are Evidence.
Nowhere in the Complaint is it alleged the reports are evidence, but OPC
now asserts this, without proper notice.  The medical panel reports only become
evidence once they are distributed to the parties, objections are made, and ruled
upon if necessary, and only “insofar ‘as the report is sustained by the testimony
admitted.’”  Johnston v. Labor Comm’n, 2013 UT App 179, ¶ 29, 307 P.3d 615,
624.   This is not a blood stain on the carpet.  The reports are not evidence until
such time as they become evidence.  They do not start out as evidence, but are




IX. No Parties were Harmed.
The complaining party got exactly what it wanted: to have none of its cases
heard by Judge Hann, following an immediate granting of its blanket motion to
recuse, with no opportunity for opposing litigants to respond.  Defense counsel
Dori Peterson wrote, “[i]f it were anyone but Judge Hann, I probably wouldn’t
think much about this, but it’s Judge Hann.”  Petersen email June 5, 2012,
Proposed trial Ex. R_35.  OPC’s complainant, Mr. Miller asserted the report he
received after learning one was shredded was “actually better than the first.” 
Proposed Ex. R_ 72.  The Labor Commission was in the best position to remedy
any harm, since Judge Hann and Judge La Jeunesse were ordered by the
Commissioner to refrain from any contact with case files or parties on the five
cases involved.  All parties should have been notified of the concerns, but Judge
Hann and Judge La Jeunesse are not privy to this information.  Their best evidence
is Hennebold’s December 6, 2012 letter, proposed Ex. R_74 indicating there were
no substantive changes to the four cases which were compared.  We have no
indication, one way or the other if the fifth set of litigants were notified and
allowed opportunity to object or seek a new medical panel report – but that
decision was made by the Commission, not Judge Hann or Judge La Jeunesse. 
WCF gained traction with the legislature and OPC, by this Complaint, has likely
00974
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succeeded in intimidating every ALJ in the state, who must now worry about bar
sanctions for interpreting the law. 
CONCLUSION
ALJs Hann and La Jeunesse at all times acted as adjudicators.  At all times
their interpretation of Section 34A-2-601 allowed them to seek clarifications from
the medical panels who are adjuncts to the ALJs prior to releasing the reports to
the parties.  Prior to the events in question, there were no written policies
prohibiting the acts, and no policies known to Judge La Jeunesse, the Director of
Adjudication or to Judge Hann.  Reports returned to the panel for clarification
were preliminary, and so was the one report shredded rather than returned.  There
was no policy directing medical panelists to retain draft reports, or for anyone to
retain preliminary reports.  OPC in asserting there were policies and law violated
failed to disclose any policy and relies on WCF’s interpretation of only subsection
(d) of 34A-2-601.  In doing so, it ignores subsection (b) of 34A-2-601, which




All acts complained of were subject to appeal by the parties, and no action
should stand against their licenses.
Dated this 12th day of February, 2016. 
LAW OFFICE OF ELIZABETH BOWMAN,
PLLC




I hereby certify that on this 12   day of February, 2016, a true and correct copy ofth
RESPONDENT’S TRIAL BRIEF was served upon counsel electronically as follows:  
Barbara L. Townsend
Assistant Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
opcfiling@utahbar.org 
/S/ Elizabeth Bowman                        
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